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THE BEST PERSON FOR THE JOB:
TOMORROW'S STANDARD FOR SELECTING
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
MARILYN J. IRELAND*
There are nine positions on the United States Supreme Court,
appointed for life by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate.' In view of the importance of the role of the Supreme
Court in the life of the nation, it ought not be surprising that
there is often controversy respecting appointments to the Court.
The nation deserves Supreme Court Justices of the highest qual-
ity. Yet, if any qualified Justices have emerged from the current
highly politicized process, it was not due to the diligence of the
presidential search for the best person, nor the Senate's require-
ment of excellent credentials for ratification. Although it is hyper-
bole to suggest that the process has hit an "all-time low," 2 clearly,
it is operating at a historic depression.'
This Article will analyze three main factors that have under-
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. B.A. 1966, Miami University;
J.D. 1969, University of Chicago.
' US. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution provides that the President "shall nomi-
nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of
the supreme Court ..... Id.
2 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Spectacles Like the Thomas Hearing are a Cost of Political Standoff, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, § 4 at 1 (Americans' confidence in Congress and Supreme Court at
all-time low); The McLaughlin Group, FED. NEWS SERV., Oct. 18, 1991 (spec. transcript) (re-
port from capital that Americans are fed up with Congress), available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, Currnt file. But see Thomas Affair: A Valuable Civics Lesson, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24,
1991, at A 16, (federal judge concluded process was valuable civic lesson to nation).
' In 1795, President Washington's nomination of John Rutledge as Chief Justice was
opposed because of Rutledge's views on foreign policy. LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT 79-80 (1985). President Grant's nomination of Ebenezer Hoar in 1870
was contested because Hoar had amassed political enemies by refusing to put politics above
competence. For example, he had favored reform of the civil service. HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
JUSTICES & PRESIDENTS 42 (2d ed. 1985). In 1937, President Hoover nominated John J.
Parker, who was said to be an anti-labor racist. TRIBE, supra, at 90. President Roosevelt's
nomination of Senator Hugo L. Black was strongly contested because he was said to favor
court packing. He also had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan. ABRAHAM, supra, at 47. G.
Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynsworth were unsuccessful Nixon nominees, defeated
amid charges of segregationism as well as questions concerning Judge Haynsworth's ethics.
TRIBE, supra, at 82-91.
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mined public confidence in the selection process. First, it will ex-
amine the political repercussion of the controversial decision by
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. It will then suggest that the
increased concentration of power in the "beltway" of Washing-
ton, D.C., coupled with the isolation and insulation of the nation's
leaders from the rest of the country has also led to distrust in the
process. Finally, the Article will suggest that the lack of a non-
partisian coalition has furthered the deterioration of the selection
process.
I. Roe v. Wade
It is usual for politics to play a role in the selection of Supreme
Court Justices. Democrats normally appoint Democrats; Republi-
cans normally appoint Republicans. The party out of power un-
derstands that its turn will come.
The highly politicized issue of abortion has taken a uniquely
central role in today's selection process. Former President Reagan
and his successor, President Bush, campaigned and were elected
on a political platform that explicitly promised to appoint anti-
abortion Supreme Court Justices. Thus, it was not merely a case
of a republican President "happening" to find a fellow Republican
to be the "best qualified" among the top candidates in the land.
Rather, the President was fulfilling a campaign promise to an im-
portant political constituency when he selected nominees to the
high Court. Competence and statesmanship were secondary. Polit-
ical expediency was primary.
The "Pro-Life" (or "Anti-Choice," depending on your point of
view) constituency has only one national objective-the reversal
of a line of judicial precedents beginning with Roe v. Wade.4 The
decision's central role in determining the future composition of
both the executive and judicial branches makes it one of the
Court's most influential decisions.
Roe was written and delivered by Justice Blackmun, a Republi-
can appointed by President Richard Nixon. Chief Justice Burger,
also a Nixon appointee, joined the majority in overturning state
- 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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abortion laws. That Justices Blackmun and Burger are Republi-
cans is ironic, because opposition to the right to abortion eventu-
ally galvanized into the "Right to Life" lobby that, with the ex-
ception of the single Carter term, has since helped to elect
republican Presidents. Those Presidents pledged to change the
make-up of the Court, and have done just that. With the addition
of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, as
well as the elevation of Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice, the
Court is now solidly conservative.
The strong shift to the Right in both the executive and judicial
branches was an unintended consequence of Roe v. Wade. While
the decision was not the exclusive reason Reagan was elected Pres-
ident, nor the only reason the Court has become more conserva-
tive, it was a contributing factor to the former, and the driving
force of the latter. Although Reagan might well have been elected
in any event, Roe guaranteed that the "Right to Life" constitu-
ency was part of the winning coalition, with its main issue domi-
nating the Supreme Court nomination process.
It would be easy to disparage the Republican party for allowing
itself to be captured by a single-issue pressure group and to criti-
cize the willingness of that group to place its issue above the insti-
tutional structures of our government. However, the difficulty
with the process does not lie with interest groups of the Right or
with interest groups of the Left organized in opposition. A closer
look at the Roe decision will reveal that the problem, in part, lies
in the decision itself.
It is axiomatic of the judicial role that courts should adjudicate
real disputes, confining themselves to the facts at issue.5 There
must be an injured party with standing to seek relief.6 In Roe, an
exception to the standing requirement was applied. Because it in-
variably takes the Supreme Court longer to decide a case than the
nine-month term of a pregnancy, most abortion issues are techni-
cally moot when they reached the Court. 7 Indeed, in Roe, the peti-
See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-58 (1911).
o See Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F. 252, (D.C. Cir.) affd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Mel-
lon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85, 488 (1923).
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 125; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240
(1937).
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tioner had already given birth by the time the case came before
the Court; nevertheless, the Court permitted the case, since it was
likely of repetition but eluded review in the normal course.8
Unconfined by the facts of the case, the Supreme Court ren-
dered, in effect, an advisory opinion that was far broader than the
facts and statutes in question.9 Evolution of law by precedent op-
erates well in small increments. Yet Roe v. Wade was not an incre-
mental addition to the law. It was not even a substantial shift in
the law. It was a revolution.
The Roe decision was based upon the privacy right to contracep-
tion recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut ° and Eisenstadt v.
Baird." The step from the right to contraception to the right to
abortion is, itself a substantial leap. More fundamentally, the
precedents relied upon by the Roe Court were not based on firmly
reasoned ground.
In Griswold, the Court offered a plethora of rationale for its
conclusion that there was a right to reproductive freedom, includ-
ing a constitutional root in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, 2
in some combination of various rights,"3 as a fundamental right
covered by the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,14 or
as a Ninth Amendment unenumerated right.1 5 The only thing
clear after Griswold, was that the basis of the right to reproductive
freedom was obscure at best. The plurality decision in Eisenstadt
left similar uncertainty.
Roe could have been the first clear expression of the right to
reproductive privacy. But the Court did not take the opportunity
to arrive at a consensus as to the theoretical underpinnings of that
right as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence. The soundness
Roe, 410 U.S. at 125; see also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969).
9 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-19. The Texas law in question in Roe forbade abortion except
when necessary to save the life of the mother. Id. at 118. In order to resolve the dispute,
the Court needed only to hold it overbroad. Id. at 164.
On the same day it decided Roe, the Supreme Court, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), invalidated a Georgia abortion statute. A more modest Court could have remanded
Doe to permit the lower court to consider the effect of Roe on the Georgia statute.
10 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
12 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
" Id. at 483-84.
" Id. at 486-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring) & 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1" Id. at 486-88 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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of the Griswold decision, and its recognition of the right of privacy
also remained in doubt until the political process placed it in the
mainstream.
Unwilling to draw the line at Roe, the Senate held the line at
Griswold. Refusing to ratify the nomination of Judge Bork to the
Supreme Court, the Senate labeled him an extremist for opposing
Griswold as well as Roe. As a result, what the Supreme Court failed
to accomplish in Roe, the Senate achieved through the confirma-
tion process; the establishment of Griswold as indisputable, al-
though vague, jurisprudence.
The Senate had, in effect, performed a judicial function by
"ratifying" Griswold. At the same time, the Roe Court attempted
to legislate the parameters of future abortion statutes through its
trimester approach. 6 The revolutionary scope of the decision,
however, left no room for political forces to operate.
In deciding Roe as it did, the Supreme Court overstepped its
bounds and misjudged its power. The nine-month gestation pe-
riod justified the Court's exception to standing. It was, therefore,
warranted in pretending that a pregnant woman stood before it.
However, she was not at one and the same time in all three tri-
mesters of pregnancy. Rather than limiting its decision to any set
of facts, the decision was overbroad.
Under whatever theory of Griswold the Court might have cho-
sen to adopt in Roe, the Court could have justified striking down
the Texas statute as unconstitutional. The Court could, and in its
judicial role should, have ended its explanation on those grounds,
leaving future cases to determine the propriety of subsequent leg-
islation restricting abortion. Subsequent battles would have been
fought in the state legislatures, with the Court authorized to strike
down state laws which unduly restricted a woman's right to abor-
tion. Although the Court would still be involved in, and ultimately
in control of, the outcome of the controversy, it could have re-
mained above the fray, rather than becoming the central target.
With the wealth of abortion cases that have bombarded the Court
since Roe v. Wade, it is clear that not only did the holding fail to
achieve judicial economy, but it also insured the Court's participa-
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
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tion in the debate.1 7
This is not to say that the Court should never take a giant step
or render a controversial opinion. Brown v. Board of Education18 is
one example of a valuable and necessary revolutionary decision.
However, in Brown, Chief Justice Warren waited until a unani-
mous opinion could be delivered. Moreover, there had been pre-
Brown incremental steps in the evolution from the segregationist
case, Plessy v. Ferguson.1 9 Prior to Brown, the Court had forbidden
segregation in upper-level education based upon records that
graphically showed the nature of the segregation.2"
In segregation cases, the picture of the black law student forced
to sit in a roped-off section of a classroom had a face. 21 That pow-
erful image manifested its own justification for the pre-Brown anti-
segregation rulings.
In contrast, Ms. Roe presented no public face at all. This set the
tone for a public debate in which the pro-abortion parties were
Dr. X, Planned Parenthood, or at best, the masked Ms. Roe or
Ms. Doe. There was no child raped by a step-parent and no de-
formed or genetically doomed baby. The most powerful image in
the abortion controversy did not come from any case; it was the
fetal face, drawn by political forces in anti-Court, anti-abortion
literature.
The Court in Roe v. Wade engendered the anti-Roe ideological
climate by behaving in an unjudicial fashion. Ironically, this single
failure has been the driving force in subsequent Court appoint-
ments. Nevertheless, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, or any sub-
stantial part of it, will similarly create its own backlash. If the con-
" See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstreticians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 767 (1986); Simopoulos v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird [11],
443 U.S. 622 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977): Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20 See, e.g., Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
" This issue was raised, and resolved favorably to the black student in McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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servative Reagan-Bush appointees proceed in a more judicial
manner, they will incrementally dismantle Roe v. Wade, much like
the Court's dismantling of Miranda v. Arizona.
2 2
Justice Scalia, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, stated
that he was ready to reverse the revolution by overturning Roe v.
Wade entirely.2" If the majority of the Court completely rejected a
woman's right to abortion-including as a life-saving procedure
for the mother, or within the first few days of pregnancy-the
controversy would be certain to continue. Worse yet, the Court
would remain entangled in a seemingly endless controversy. In
twenty years, the litmus test for Supreme Court appointees may
be that the nominee favors restoration of abortion rights. In or-
der to escape this "Catch-22," recapture the dignity of the Court,
and restore confidence in the selection process, the Court must
return to its proper judicial role.
II. BELTWAY ISOLATION AND INSULATION
A second factor which has led to a deterioration of the selection
process relates to the governing class. Republicans seem to have a
lock on the presidency; Democrats a lock on Congress.2" Incum-
bents are so seldom defeated that the term "entrenched incum-
bent" is usually a redundancy. A number of factors, including
greater visibility, the methods of financing campaigns, and the
format of media coverage of elections, protect the power elite
from all but the most serious of political miscalculations. With re-
spect to the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the reason
for beltway entrenchment 25 is less important than the fact.
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 423 (1987); Colorado
v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987): Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Colorado v. Con-
nelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), affd, 254 N.W.2d 29
(Mich.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
" Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
4 See Dennis Camire, Louisiana Lawmakers Disagree on How the Year Went in Congress, Dec.
18, 1991 (Republican Jim McCrery states Democrats control the Senate "lock stock and
barrel"), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file.
2'5 The term "beltway" has come into common parlance to refer to Washington D.C. and
its surroundings. More particularly, it refers to the elite governing class, rather than to the
general inhabitants of the region that includes Washington D.C. and nearby suburbs in
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The power elite in Washington, D.C. includes appointed and
elected officials, as well as lobbyists and others who share a com-
mon political culture. Although congressmen and Senators have a
toe in their home states, they associate in the local beltway with
professional colleagues from both parties, as members of an elite
class. Staffers, bureau chiefs, and heads of executive departments
round out the social and professional cadre of the leaders of our
nation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Supreme Court nominees
often descend from this group. Justice Rehnquist was an attorney
on the White House staff. Since his appointment, the two most
controversial and divisive confirmation battles have concerned
Washington insiders. Justice Thomas first worked as an aide to
Senator Danforth and then held high offices as a political ap-
pointee in the executive branch. He was confirmed only after a
process so grueling that he stated that he wished he had never
been nominated. Prior to Justice Thomas's nomination, another
beltway nominee, former Solicitor General Bork, ultimately failed
to be confirmed in a similarly controversial confirmation battle.
The strong challenge to both the Bork and the Thomas nomi-
nations did not emanate from the Senate itself, but from the
country. A Supreme Court appointment may be important to the
nation, but is not of great concern to the average Senator. A re-
publican Senator who broke with the President would do so at
substantial cost, yet, there is no mechanism to insure that demo-
cratic Senators oppose confirmation in unison. Inevitably, there
will be favors owed or sought. Token opposition of the President's
choice would only become true rejection when fortified with de-
mands from back home.
In the case of the two beltway nominees, Bork and Thomas,
people back home did object. In the case of the Bork nomination,
"People for the American Way" joined a coalition of interest
Virginia and Maryland. See, e.g., Rep. Swift's Visit-Hazardous Waste Not Forgotten as an Issue
Needing Attention, SEATTLE TIMrs, Nov. 10, 1991, at A23; see also Garry Sturgess & Eric
Effron, Thomas Tempest Leaves Losers in Its Wake, N.J. L.J., Oct. 31, 1991, at 15 [hereinafter
Thomas Tempest] (referring to influence of "inside the Beltway elites" on candidate); Hear-
ing of the House Armed Services Committee, Dec. 13, 1991 (different mentality inside
Beltway than rural Western Maryland), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file.
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groups in order to lobby effectively against Judge Bork on a na-
tional scale. 6 In a true grass-roots effort, the lobby convinced the
Senate that Judge Bork was an extremist, or at least, that there
was more to lose back home than there was to gain in the beltway
by supporting his nomination.
The objection from back home with regard to Justice Thomas
was a charge of sexual harassment leveled from a Professor of
Law in Oklahoma. The Senate was both shocked and outraged by
this torpedo from the heartland." They empathized with Justice
Thomas, not only as a particularly privileged male, but also as a
Washingtonian with provincial problems. Prior to this assault
from the heartland, Justice Thomas was well on the way to confir-
mation in spite of inadequately explored allegations that his char-
acter was seriously flawed. A national outcry resulted in a delay in
confirmation. Although Justice Thomas was eventually confirmed,
the Senate has been criticized from both the Right and the Left
for the way it conducted the proceedings. 8 From a Senator's
point of view, the nomination was politically costly.29 Although
the outcry ultimately failed to materialize in sufficient numbers to
block confirmation, the political cost back home was real.
Beltway candidates may be convenient appointees for the Presi-
dent, but their selection may continue to be costly to the Senate.
More importantly, they may prove to be costly to the nation. The
Supreme Court does not ride circuit in any true sense. It too may
be in danger of becoming a "beltway institution," cut off from the
go People for the American Way also opposed the Thomas nomination, but did not use
the all-out advertising tactic it had relied upon in opposing Judge Bork. See Douglas Frantz,
Emotions Swirl over Fairness of Hearing Process; Committee: Thomas and Biden Differ over Role of
the Inquiry. At Issue is Whether the System is Out of Control, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at A 15.
27 See Nightline: A Town Meeting: A Process Run Amok: Can it Be Fixed? (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Nightlinel, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt
file. A particularly revealing discussion of the Senate Judiciary Committee process occurred
on the ABC News Nightline television program hosted by Ted Koppel on October 16,
1991. In that discussion, Senator Simpson referred to the charges of Professor Hill as a
"low blow" and as "throwing stuff over the transom." Id.
The transom metaphor is consistent with the notion of the beltway as a tangible barrier,
a closed door locking out the rest of the nation. Like a "bolt from the blue" or a "shot out
of nowhere," "throwing stuff over the transom" suggests an invasion of supposedly safe
space by an outsider.
28 See id.
29 See Thomas Tempest, supra note 25, at 15.
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realities of the rest of the nation. This is particularly so if its ranks
are to be filled from the capital's elite rather than from the most
qualified persons in the entire nation.
III. THE PARTISAN POLITICAL SPLIT
Indisputably the process of selecting a nominee is complicated;
neither Republicans nor Democrats totally dominate the process.
However, the Senate has demonstrated that it is willing to confirm
even conservative candidates, so long as the nomination does not
come at the expense of votes back home.30
The most liberal of Senators are able to work with the most
conservative of Presidents when both are politically advantaged by
the interaction. Why then, can't the President's operatives unite
with the Senate Judiciary Committee to agree on a list of highly
qualified and acceptable candidates?
Both the President and the Democrats on the Judiciary Com-
mittee have, in the past, concluded that there is a partisan advan-
tage in continued controversy. Apparently, the President can
score points with parts of his constituency by going to battle with
the Senate liberals. No glory need be shared with the opposition if
a nomination is confirmed through an embattled victory. In the
case of defeat, another nominee can always be had. Similarly,
democratic Senators can maintain their liberal constituencies by
opposing the President's will, even if they do so ineffectively. A
victory benefits the President, as does an occasional defeat. Defeat
benefits the opposition Democrats, so long as there is the occa-
sional victory. The balance of power is maintained, and both par-
ties benefit by the continued battle. At least, so it has been in the
recent past.
However, Americans are beginning to see the damage to the
nation caused by the partisan wrangling over Supreme Court
30 The majority of the Court currently consists of Reagan/Bush nominees. Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy were Reagan appointees; President Bush nominated Jus-
tices Souter and Thomas. To these should also be added Chief justice Rehnquist. Origi-
nally a Nixon appointee, he was elevated to the Chief Justice chair by President Reagan. In
addition to Justice Rehnquist, President Nixon appointed Justices Blackmun and Powell.
Justice Stevens was appointed by President Ford. All of the Justices sitting today were nom-
inated by a republican President. All were confirmed by a democratic Senate.
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nominees. When the complaints from back home overcome the
political points scored by continued conflict, a new spirit of coop-
eration and statesmanship may begin to prevail. Such a change, if
it comes at all, will not come too soon.
IV. THE PROCESS: A NEED FOR REFORM
There is, among the electorate, an increasingly vocal sentiment
to "throw the politicians all out." '81 Perhaps this sentiment, cou-
pled with the obvious debacle of the Thomas nomination, will en-
courage future Presidents, in consultation with the Senate, to
draw a long list of the most highly qualified men and women in
the nation. Should another vacancy arise, the selection should
come from that list.
If the President does not develop a selection criteria with
greater emphasis on candidate quality and less on single-issue
politics, the Senate could take the high ground by doing so itself.
Recent exposure to the public eye may inspire the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the Senate to draft some standards in advance, docu-
menting the qualities they expect of a Supreme Court Justice. A
public expression of objective criteria would permit the Judiciary
Committee and the Senate to exercise a more positive role in the
process.
A process that focuses on qualifications need not preclude other
factors, including political party affiliation and ideology, from con-
sideration. However, some standards other than ideology, parti-
sanship, and cronyism, stated as objectively as possible and in ad-
vance, either by the President or the Senate, would surely help to
restore public confidence in the process.
Ultimately, both the President and the Senate should be leery
of nominations from the beltway. No matter how competent and
honorable the candidate, there is a danger of insularity on the
Court, as well as the likelihood of opposition from back home.
" The most recent election was marked by an anti-incumbent fever. In addition, there
have been a number of voter initiatives to limit the terms of elected officials. See Marshall
Ingwerson, U.S. Elections Display Voter Ire at Incumbents, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 7,
199 1, at I; Paul Jacobs, Schabarum to Seek Term Limits for California Congressional Delegation,
L.A. Tiurs, Nov. 6, 1991, at A3, A4.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, the American public has the power to resolve the
problem simply by electing a Congress and a President from the
same party. In selecting that party, it would do well to consider
the role of both parties in creating the current cloud over the rep-
utation of the Court. Who has done the better job-the President
in selecting the brightest and best possible Supreme Court candi-
dates, or the Senate in fulfilling its obligation to advise and
consent?
Regardless of the outcome of the political process, the Supreme
Court Justices hold the fate of the Court, as an institution, in their
hands. The quality of the nominees will be judged by their per-
formance as ratified Justices. When performing their judicial func-
tions, however, the Justices should be ever mindful of the danger
to the Court and the process when they step out of their judicial
roles.
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